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Is intersectional racial justice organizing possible?
Confronting generic intersectionality
Ashlee Christoffersen
History and School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
ABSTRACT
This article empirically charts how a discursive construction of the separation of
race and racial justice organizing, and “intersectionality” serves to uphold white
supremacy and efface intersectional marginalization among people of colour.
Undertaking the first study of how UK policymakers and practitioners in
equality organizations understand and operationalize “intersectionality”, it
maps “generic intersectionality”, which is delivered to benefit “all”. Through
empirical examples, its detrimental effects for racial and intersectional justice
are demonstrated. First, it is used as a rationale for a relinquishment of a focus
on race/racism; racial justice organizations are constructed as uniquely incapable
of doing intersectionality. Second, “neutral”, “unspecific” representatives are
constructed as those capable of knowing about and doing intersectionality.
Intersectionally marginalized people are constituted as non-credible knowers and
doers of intersectionality. Generic intersectionality is a novel use of
intersectionality, which gives a new name to liberal sameness and constructs
its beneficiaries as a monolithic, white “everyone”.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 4 January 2021; Accepted 15 April 2021
KEYWORDS Intersectionality; racial justice; NGOs; equality policy; white supremacy; culture wars
Introduction
The term “intersectionality”, applied by Kimberlé Crenshaw to Black women’s
theorizing of racialized sexism and gendered racism (Amos et al. 1984; Cren-
shaw 1989, 1991; Collins 1990; Anthias 1993; Mirza 1997), has been steadily
growing in popularity across academia, popular culture, social movements,
the third sector and policymaking. As to the latter, at Westminster an “Equal-
ity Hub” recently formed in the Cabinet Office will, apparently, deal with inter-
sectionality (Government Equalities Office 2019). For a government that
“stands unequivocally against” the Critical Race Theory from which intersec-
tionality emerged (Trilling 2020), this is perhaps yet more evidence of what
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Sirma Bilge has termed intersectionality’s “whitening” (Bilge 2013), its appro-
priation by white feminism and by what in the UK goes by Equality, Diversity
and Inclusion. In the USA, intersectionality’s popularity has generated “back-
lash” (May 2015; Mohdin 2020), while in the UK, perhaps, there is a different
story: one of governments comprised of parties along the political spectrum
increasingly instrumentalizing intersectionality, and giving it competing
meanings to suit their interests at different junctures (Christoffersen, 2021).
In spite of its popularity, intersectionality presents an ontological challenge
that cannot be overstated to equality policy and practice, since they
remain largely siloed into single identity/issue sub-sectors structured from
the understanding that equality groups are homogenously and singularly
marginalized. Against the backdrop of its popularity driven by public dis-
course as well as the UK’s multi-strand equality policy context enshrined in
the Equality Act 2010, this article is based on research which asked: (i) what
intersectionality means to equality policymakers and third sector prac-
titioners in racial justice, feminist, disability rights, LGBTI rights, refugee
organizations and intersectional combinations, in both England and Scotland;
and (ii) how, and in whose interests, it is used.
Intersectionality theory often includes mutual constitution of inequalities
(Collins 1990), different levels of analysis (Crenshaw 1991), relationality
(Collins and Bilge 2016) and focus on those who are intersectionally margin-
alized (in particular Black women and women of colour) (Crenshaw 1989,
1991). Yet as the term “intersectionality” has grown in popularity and use,
its meaning is a ground of contestation (Alexander-Floyd 2012; Bilge 2013;
Jordan-Zachery 2013). In short, several authors argue that, in Vivian
M. May’s words, “though intersectionality is widely known, acclaimed, and
applied, it is often construed in ways that depoliticize, undercut, or even
violate its most basic premises” (May 2015, i). In Europe, a tendency has
been observed and named, “to find valuable a ‘purified’ intersectionality,
quarantined from its exposure to race” (Tomlinson 2013, 266; Lewis 2013).
Indeed, focus on race within intersectionality canons has been found to be
less prevalent in Europe than in the USA (Mügge 2018).
In policy and practice, due to both the relative novelty of attempts to oper-
ationalize it and the workings of gendered racism, it is ripe for co-optation, in
the form of distancing it from both its radical origins in Black and women of
colour’s activism and social justice aims. While Black women can be viewed as
key subjects of intersectionality (Jordan-Zachery 2013), it is being controver-
sially operationalized for a more generalized “equality” and applied to a range
of marginalized social groups (Christoffersen 2019) by academics, policy-
makers and practitioners alike. Particularly in UK equality policy, it is typically
used in an unspecified way, across up to the nine “protected characteristics”
named in the Equality Act 2010: age, disability, gender re-assignment (i.e.
transgender status), marriage or civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity,
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race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation (Christoffersen 2019). Ange-
Marie Hancock argues that intersectionality’s analytic/ontological project, to
reconstitute relationships between categories of difference, is inseparable
from its “project to render visible and remediable previously invisible, unad-
dressed material effects of the sociopolitical location of Black women or
women of color” (Hancock 2016, 33). In different sites of practice, depending
on whether race, “a central analytic element that cannot be jettisoned
without inflicting fatal violence on the integrity of intersectionality’s intellec-
tual project” (Hancock 2016, 13), continues to be a central focus, intersection-
ality’s contemporary uses may variously be found to be an extended
application of intersectionality or an effacement of Black women, women
of colour and the intersection of race and gender (Christoffersen 2019). Yet
Jennifer Nash has more recently argued that in a US context, Black feminist
critique of intersectionality’s appropriation can fall into proprietary narratives
which engender a defensiveness which serves to stall Black feminist theoriz-
ing, and proposed “letting go” (Nash 2019).
Nash’s argument is compelling, and yet it remains important to carefully
examine dynamics of appropriation in a European context similarly character-
ized by antiblackness, which disavows and displaces race (Lewis 2013; Mügge
2018). It also remains important to examine these dynamics in a particular UK
context, which consistently fails to act on long-accumulated bodies of evi-
dence of systemic racism and antiblackness more specifically (Meer 2020),
and in which most uses of intersectionality in equality policy fail to meaning-
fully engage with race and race/gender as central social organizing logics and
categories of intersectionality theory (Christoffersen 2019). Black feminists
theorize the ways in which Black women, “as both representation and embo-
died, sentient being[s]” (Lewis 2017, 117), are effaced, discursively and mate-
rially made absent across many sites; meanings and uses of intersectionality
in policy and practice are sites of this epistemological and material erasure of
Black women, as both knowledge producers and actors in these social worlds,
as well as of their resistance to it (in other words, perhaps, their “presencing”)
(Lewis 2017).
There has been little research on intersectionality’s operationalization in
established third sector equality organizations or coalitions/networks of
organizations, particularly in the UK context (with some exceptions:
Sudbury 1998; Bassel and Emejulu 2017). Moreover, there is a dearth of
research internationally specifically exploring how intersectionality is under-
stood. Based on fieldwork conducted primarily with three local networks of
third sector equality organizations, I developed a typology of five competing
concepts of intersectionality circulating in UK third sector equality organizing,
each with different implications for intersectionally marginalized groups and
intersectional justice (Christoffersen, 2021). In this article, I focus on one,
“generic intersectionality”, wherein there is little focus on any equality
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strand1 in particular, and similar work is delivered to benefit “all”. I argue that
this concept emerged in contexts of: (i) “cohesion”, (ii) a multi-strand equality
policy framework including a Scottish duty to “mainstream” equality and (iii)
austerity. I focus on generic intersectionality because, while many have noted
the ways in which intersectionality may be reduced to and used synony-
mously with “diversity” (e.g. May 2015; Nash 2019), generic intersectionality
is a distinctive, insidious and novel use of intersectionality, which instrumen-
talizes it to give a new name to liberal sameness and constructs its benefici-
aries as a monolithic, white “everyone”.
Moreover, generic intersectionality has particularly detrimental effects for
racial and intersectional justice, which I demonstrate through empirical
examples. First, it is used as a rationale for a relinquishment of a focus on
race/racism; in this discourse, racial justice organizations are constructed as
uniquely incapable of doing intersectionality. Second, within a generic intersec-
tionality discourse, there is a preference for “neutral”, “unspecific” representa-
tives, constructed as the only ones capable of knowing about and doing
intersectionality. Intersectionally marginalized people (and organizations of
them) are thus constituted as non-credible knowers and doers of
intersectionality.
This has important policy and practice implications not least because,
since this research was conducted, a range of new resourcing from both
public and private sources has been dedicated to racial justice work in the
light of contemporary Black Lives Matter movements (in the UK, in spite of
Westminster’s current pursuit of a “white nationalist” agenda (Siddique
2020)). Within a generic intersectionality discourse where intersectionality
is constructed in exclusive association with whiteness, this new racial
justice work would be constructed as incapable of being “intersectional”, to
the detriment of both racial justice organizing, which is thus discursively
re-siloed away from intersectionality and work on other equality strands of
gender, disability and LGBTI, and intersectional justice itself. If the opportu-
nity for progress engendered by BLM is not to be squandered and past fail-
ings are not to be repeated, we need to squarely interrogate the
determinants and effects of generic intersectionality, namely: the discursive
construction of the separation of race and racial justice organizing on the
one hand and intersectionality on the other serves the dual purpose of
upholding white supremacy and effacing intersectional marginalization
among people of colour.
Equality policy and the equality third sector
The UK’s internationally unique unification of equality legislation and archi-
tecture creates both opportunities and challenges for intersectionality’s
4 D. ASHLEE CHRISTOFFERSEN
operationalization (Solanke 2011; Gedalof 2013; Hankivsky, de Merich, and
Christoffersen 2019; Christoffersen 2019).
Beginning in the late 1990s, equality law and policy in the UK began to
move from a purely anti-discrimination approach addressed piecemeal
from the mid-1960s onwards to a more proactive one placing positive
duties on government to promote equality of opportunity. This move was
heavily influenced by the recognition of institutional racism in the public
sector following the Macpherson inquiry (Macpherson 1999) into the
murder of Stephen Lawrence and by European Union directives (themselves
influenced by UK race equality policy (Meer 2017)). The Equality Act 2010 was
developed in light of a comprehensive review of equality legislation initiated
by the Labour government. It covers England, Scotland and Wales and brings
together disparate anti-discrimination legislation with stated aims to achieve
greater simplicity and parity. In spite of lobbying from third sector organiz-
ations, some groups (notably refugees) are not specifically recognized in
the Act. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), established in
2007, replaced separate commissions on disability, gender and race. The
Act places proactive obligations to eliminate discrimination and harassment,
advance equality of opportunity and promote good relations for people with
“protected characteristics” on more than 40,000 public bodies (including
central government departments; local governments; and health, education,
policing and transport bodies) through the public sector equality duty (PSED).
The PSED replaced separate positive duties for race, disability and gender that
were in effect from 2001, 2006 and 2007, respectively (Christoffersen 2019).
The Equality Act 2010 and its predecessor legislation across race, disability
and gender can be understood as the products of contentious claims-making,
for rights and from refusals of exclusion from the welfare state, by a range of
actors from intersecting marginalized groups, among which sits the equality
third sector, comprising voluntary and community as well as social enterprise
organizations that have emerged because of inequality related to markers of
identity, and aim to increase equality. This sector plays a key and at times
overlooked role in knowledge production and equality policymaking and
implementation, as well as being engaged in more autonomous work to
increase equality. Equality third sector organizations have been campaigning
for legislative and policy change at local, national and UK-wide levels, and
delivering activity and increasingly, services aimed at increasing equality
for many decades. While I take the “equality sector”, which has histories of
self-organizing around shared experiences of discrimination, as subject,
there are vital distinctions between sub-sectors within it along lines of experi-
ence of intersectional privilege and marginalization. Sub-sectors have distinct
histories and complexities, and within them, there has often been conflict
concerning the extent of independence vs. co-option vis-à-vis the state.
Some organizations and practitioners in the UK equality sector were
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“doing” intersectionality long before it became a buzzword among policy-
makers (among intersectional organizations marginal and under-resourced
compared with single strand ones, for instance, the Black women’s sector),
though this has not always been named or considered as such. Equality
organizations, which have been largely focussed on single issues/identities,
do variously: campaigning and policy engagement, community develop-
ment/engagement and service delivery. While they are often problematically
conflated,2 I distinguish the third sector from the grassroots (grassroots organ-
izations, social movements, individual activists and campaigners); for my pur-
poses, third sector organizations are either formally constituted or funded,
and usually both.
Methodology
I explored how equality third sector organizations and equality policymakers
understand and operationalize intersectionality through case studies of inter-
sectionality’s conceptualization and use within networks of equality organiz-
ations. Networks were selected because of the relational orientation of
intersectionality, and because for this reason, coalition working is a consistent
theme in the literature on intersectionality in practice (Collins and Bilge 2016).
The networks all aim broadly at cooperation to address inequality and
advance equality. They were selected because they include different types
of equality organizations, explicitly take an intersectional approach and
have a policy intermediary, representative role. The first network seeks to
advance equality, promote human rights and address poverty; the second
to enable cross-sector cooperation on equality; and the third and largest,
to advance equality, respond to discrimination and aim for social justice.
The cases are balanced across geography, length of establishment, size and
length of time spent applying intersectionality. Research participants
worked for the networks themselves and their member organizations
(racial justice, women’s, disability rights, LGBTI rights, refugee, faith, Deaf,
trans and intersectional).
The case studies were conducted within an intersectional, feminist and
antiracist theoretical framework. Intersectionality has itself been described
as an “epistemological orientation” and “ontological project” (May 2015,
34), characterized by attention to context, positionality and experience
in knowledge production, and viewing multiplicity, including the simulta-
neity and contingency of power, oppression and privilege, as logical rather
than incoherent (May 2015; Hancock 2016). Within this antiracist feminist
frame, white supremacy is considered a central structure of social life
(intersected with others) (Mills 2017). This is an important framework to
identify, since it does not necessarily follow from uses of “intersectional
feminist”.
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In light of debates in intersectionality studies about white appropriation of
intersectionality (Bilge 2013; Jordan-Zachery 2013; Lewis 2013) from Black/
women of colour/indigenous feminism, as a white woman, I will contextualize
what motivated me to conduct this research (Christoffersen 2018): my key
point of entry to this project was my background as a practitioner in my
sector of interest, specifically in a Black-led LGBTQ community development
organization3 committed to working intersectionally. My practitioner back-
ground enabled me to recruit and gain access to networks. In some respects,
in order to understand more about white supremacy, my racialization as
white was advantageous. Some of what white research participants said to
me about race, people of colour and racial justice organizations explored in
this article, would likely not have been said to me if I had not been white.
However, it is also possible (though not essentially determined) (Gunaratnam
2003) that some participants of colour would have said more or said differ-
ently if I were also, and that others from a more connected racialized social
position would have “seen more” than I did in these interactions. I built
points of connectivity (Gunaratnam 2003) with participants by explicitly
acknowledging both similarities as well as racialized and other differences.
The complexity of both intersectionality and the social world of the equal-
ity third sector means that one methodological approach or method on its
own was insufficient to research the relationship between them, and to do
so “intersectionally”. My methodology drew principally on ethnography
and participatory research. For 1.5 years, like network members, I attended
semi-regular meetings and events and participated in network email lists.
The research, therefore, has particular characteristics of ethnography: at
times my role as a researcher was ambiguous, and I influenced the social
worlds through my participation, and thus participant narratives. Conducting
ethnography allowed me to build relationships with participants over time,
which is important to establish trust when conducting qualitative research
across differences (Edwards 1990). Networks were involved in the develop-
ment of research questions and design. Some participants conducted data





. 39 with representatives of organizations from 13 equality sub-
sectors/intersectional combinations and network staff
. 2 with policymakers
Focus groups 1 in total
Participant observation 9 network meetings and events
Documentary analysis . 24 national and UK level equality policy documents
. 42 (total) documents pertaining to the case study equality networks
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Individuals, organizations, networks and cities are anonymized; all names
used are pseudonyms. I held several sessions to share and co-construct
findings with participants, assessing knowledge claims through dialogue
(Collins 1990).
I will now turn to explore the emergence and effects of generic intersec-
tionality through two empirical examples.
Constructing racial justice organizations as incapable of doing
intersectionality
“Generic intersectionality” is a concept of intersectionality, wherein there is
no focus, or very little focus, on any equality strand or strands in particular
(Christoffersen 2021). The same or similar work is addressed at and delivered
to benefit “everybody”, not only or even mainly marginalized equality groups.
From this perspective, working on issues that affect only the most disadvan-
taged is constructed as being not intersectional. Its emergence at the local
level is closely related to austerity: it is much less expensive to do generic
intersectionality than to do, respectively, race, gender, disability, religion/
belief and LGBTI equality (Christoffersen 2020).
One equality network, in particular, employed an application of generic
intersectionality. Network organizer Leanne described their intersectional
approach, which amounted to treating everyone the same.
We weren’t grouping people by characteristic… it was just [undertaking the
same work with everyone]… the idea was for that to be intersectional and
also inclusive and accessible…We didn’t go to a group of people with disabil-
ities [sic] and say, you know, “Well, talk to us about your disability?”We…went
to a group of… [Black and minority ethnic] BME young carers, and none of
them mentioned their BME, or young carer identity. That’s not how they’re
defined in the world and that was really nice.
On the one hand, it may be viewed as positive practice not to expect
people to be (solely) defined by their equality strand/s; on the other hand,
it seems problematic (and perhaps of little analytical significance) to cele-
brate the fact that people of colour talked about equality without mentioning
race. The responses given will also be influenced by who was doing the
asking, i.e. white practitioners.
The meaning of intersectionality as generic equality was found among pol-
icymakers in some contexts and the overlap between policymakers, the
public sector and third sectors; I did not find it in more grassroots (unfunded)
organizations. In other words, this understanding was limited to more power-
ful actors. It was prevalent in networks which work across competing dis-
courses of identity-based “equality” and socioeconomic “inequality” (the
latter constructed as white, in racialized discourses of the “white working
class” and the “Left Behind” (Bhambra 2017)).
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In terms of the individual positionality of participants, this meaning was
less prevalent among those with marginalized aspects of identity and more
prevalent among those with privileged ones. It was only associated with
white participants (the significance of which will be highlighted in the follow-
ing discussions). Those who held this understanding mainly reported learning
about intersectionality in academic environments.
A generic approach to equality was perceived by some practitioners and
scholars in the context of the Equality Act and its mainstreaming duty in
Scotland (Campbell 2014), while I have identified how intersectionality is
mobilized to be constitutive with this approach (Christoffersen 2021; Chris-
toffersen 2020). While recognizing it particularly among public sector col-
leagues, most participants strongly rejected this concept of
intersectionality, viewing it as a co-option of intersectionality which is
funder-driven and serves to devalue more productive concepts of intersec-
tionality (Christoffersen 2021) as well as intersectional organizations (con-
stituted around the intersection of two or more equality strands, e.g.
BME women of faith organizations). They also perceived generic intersec-
tionality as closely related to policy reduction of “equality” to “inequality”
and poverty.
Since it treats everyone the same, work on specific inequalities is inconsist-
ent with generic intersectionality. Yet within a generic understanding of it,
intersectionality is also mobilized to displace specific attention to racial
justice in particular, in spite of intersectionality’s origins in theorizing the syn-
thesis of race, class and gender. Generic intersectionality is used as a rationale
for a relinquishment of a focus on race/racism; in this discourse, racial justice
organizations are constructed as uniquely incapable of doing intersectionality.
At the UK and national levels, meanings of intersectionality as “generic”
emerged in contexts of “cohesion”, i.e. policy fear of racialized minority
faiths and divestment from concepts of institutional racism, and the multi-
strand equality policy framework represented by the Equality Act. To con-
struct this meaning, intersectionality needed to be emptied of its association
with race and race/gender; ideally, racial justice needed to be dispensed with
altogether. To this end, across cities in both England and Scotland, I observed
a unique pressure on organizations dedicated to racial justice to relinquish
their specific focus on race, i.e. to broaden their areas of work.
From the late 1990s/early 2000s, accelerating following social uprisings of
predominantly minority ethnic people in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley,
there was a policy shift away from “multiculturalism” towards “cohesion”
and “integration” (Afridi and Warmington 2009; Meer and Modood 2014),4
i.e. assimilation (Lewis 2005). As part of this transition, there was a govern-
ment policy against “single group” funding (Cantle 2001), later successfully
challenged by a key Black5 feminist organization, Southall Black Sisters. This
policy meant that for a time, organizations led by and for particular minority
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ethnic communities were not entitled to government funding, as this was
constructed as counterproductive to cohesion and integration. Therefore,
some equality organizations were forced to place less emphasis on
working with their specific target communities (Afridi and Warmington 2009).
In 2010, the Communities Secretary, Labour MP John Denham, stated that
it was “time to move on from the one-dimensional race agenda” (Craig 2011,
381), in the context of the Equality Act 2010, which entrenched a move to a
united, multiple equalities or “multi-strand” policy framework. Here, Aziz,
director of a racial justice organization in Scotland, explains the concerns
that they had about the Act in the racial justice sector, which viewed legis-
lation on race as being comparatively strong:
One of the issues with [the Equality Act] and all the… race organisations… did
have some reservations about the legislation and it’s come true in terms of race.
What was said at that time is they wanted to bring everybody together so every-
body got the same service and all that. The race dealing community was very
fearful that the 1971 Act [sic] then the amendment act was very strong. It
was a strong piece of legislation. We as organisations or practitioners, we
were very, very clear that the new legislation should bring the rest to par
rather than dumb down the race and it happened. You can see now… race
is nowhere to be seen and where race used to get resources, nobody gets
resources now.
Fears of dilution with the Equality Act 2010 seem to have come to some
fruition as far as race is concerned. In both England and Scotland, since the
establishment of the EHRC which replaced the Commission for Racial Equality
(CRE), race equality councils have become less widespread. Many of these
councils, first constituted under early race (“community relations”) legislation,
have closed due to lack of funding which used to come from the CRE. Of
those that are left, many now work in a way where race equality is not the
focus (e.g. through rebranding to “equality councils” rather than race equality
councils). In England, this is not uniform. For those for which this is the case,
the Equality Act was cited by participants as the reason for this rebranding. In
Scotland, however, pressure was more acute, reportedly coming in the form
of a directive from the Scottish government for race equality councils to relin-
quish a dedication to race, and to change their names, as a condition of
funding (interview with policymaker, 2018). Moreover, here previous research
found that following the closure of the CRE, the EHRC (when it still had funds
to disburse to equality organizations) did not fund any racial justice organiz-
ations in 2009/2010, while in the preceding financial year, the race sector had
received the largest share of funding, and other strand sectors continued to
be funded (Campbell 2014). A director of a former race equality council
explained,
EHRC came along which then totally there was no funding… name-wise
because there was no core funding, a lot of them had to close down…We
10 D. ASHLEE CHRISTOFFERSEN
have to move with the times. Whether we liked it or not. So, therefore the name
changes and also our way of working changed.
The finding that race equality organizations experienced various pressures
to relinquish a focus on race is very significant, since other strand organiz-
ations/sectors did not report the same pressure to lose the focus on their
strand, nor did I observe it. In other words, there seems to have been a
clear double standard at play, wherein in the new multi-strand policy
context and amidst intersectionality’s growing popularity, race equality
organizations were expected to immediately begin working on other equality
areas, a standard that white-led and predominantly white equality sectors
were not held to in the same way. One reason for this discrepancy is that
by policymakers and funders, and equality organizations and practitioners
in other sectors also, race equality itself, and the racial justice sector, are con-
structed as being very specific in a way that, in comparison, other (predomi-
nantly white, and white-led) single strand sectors are not (women’s, disability,
LGBTI). In other words, institutional racism is at work, and whiteness is recon-
structed as normative, at the same time that institutional racism is con-
structed as passé. The equality areas that other sectors work in, always
already constructed as white, are concurrently by necessity also (re)con-
structed as separate from race. This in turn effaces the overlapping groups
of women of colour, and disabled and LGBTI people of colour.
I found that, further, intersectionality (as generic equality) was used as a
rationale for this relinquishment of a focus on race and racism. Moreover,
since race is constructed as very specific, and intersectionality as generic,
racial justice organizations are constructed as uniquely incapable of doing inter-
sectionality, compared with other equality sectors. The following quote is a
reflection on these organizations at the time my research was conducted, a
good eight years following name changes and broadening of work into
“equality” organizations among the former race equality councils.
I don’t think they could generally even now call themselves [intersectional]…
organisations. Peter, Policymaker.
Racial justice organizations were viewed as incapable of intersectionality
not only by policymakers but by other (white) practitioners employing a
generic concept of intersectionality: one similarly stated that they did not
feel that a particular organization was intersectional; though it had
changed its name to a “regional” equality council, it was still really doing
race (not “intersectionality”); after a pause, they said “that obviously is impor-
tant…” (field notes, 2018). This is in spite of the fact that some race equality
councils had dedicated work concerning the intersection of race and gender,
even before this directive to change focus came about.6 In fact, the policy-
maker quoted above reflected that they did so, but nevertheless felt that
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these organizations were incapable of intersectionality. Here, intersectionality
is conceptualized generically, firmly distanced from race/gender and women
of colour. Intersectionality is used generically to delegitimize work on race
specifically, and in so doing, it reconstructs race as separate from other
strand work, reinforcing siloed thinking.
In sum, there was a perceived hierarchy of grounds before the Equality Act,
with race secondary to other inequalities (notably gender, constructed as
white). Thereafter, in contexts of cohesion and the Equality Act, “intersection-
ality” has come to be appropriated and instrumentalized to give a new name
to generic approaches to equality. These approaches uniquely target racial
justice organizing as passé in a “postracial” discourse which works to
uphold white supremacy through discursive consignment of racism to the
past, and thus denial of the contemporary significance of race (Goldberg
2015), and as incapable of incorporating intersectionality. Racial justice orga-
nizing is constructed as the past, and (generic) intersectionality as the present
and future.
Yet since the events described here, in some ways, the “one-dimensional
race agenda” has re-emerged. In Scotland, there is some limited
attention to (non-generic) intersectionality within the Race Equality Frame-
work and Action Plan (Christoffersen 2019). In England, however, among
prominent figures in the “race disparity” initiatives, intersectionality was
constructed as a luxury that might come later (conversation with policy-
maker, 2018); there are no clear intersectionality advocates among them
nor among the more recently established (and subsequently discredited)
Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities; and key leaders are men. The
construction of this meaning of intersectionality has important material
and discursive effects for racial justice organizing, and developing uses of
“intersectionality” at Westminster require careful interrogation as to its
generic quality.
In discourses of generic intersectionality, racial justice organizations may
find themselves forced to stop focussing on race in order to “progress” inter-
sectionality; whether or not they do so to remain competitive with other
equality organizations, they are constructed as uniquely incapable of doing
intersectionality as compared with the white women’s, disability and LGBTI
sectors. In a context where intersectionality is flavour of the month by
some local governments and the Scottish government, racial justice organiz-
ations are further disadvantaged vis-à-vis white-led organizations. Discur-
sively, this constructs intersectionality in exclusive association with the
racial discourse of whiteness (Leonardo 2002), imbuing it with connotations
of being “progressive” (intersectional), serving ultimately to uphold and
bolster white supremacy, and to efface intersectional marginalization
among people of colour.
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Constructing the desirability of “neutral” intersectionality
representatives
This second example shows how within a generic intersectionality dis-
course, there is a preference for “neutral”, “unspecific” representatives,
who are constructed as the only ones really capable of knowing about
and doing intersectionality. Intersectionally marginalized people (and organ-
izations of them) are thus constituted as non-credible knowers and doers of
intersectionality.
The equality network that employed generic intersectionality fell particu-
larly short of being “representative” of intersectionally marginalized people,
as compared with the other two case study networks. During my fieldwork,
it had low levels of engagement overall (relatively few members, few of
whom attended meetings, or participated in consultation exercises
between equality communities and local government). In my field notes, I
reflected that the few people at meetings seemed to know one another
(field notes, 2017). Network staff described aspirations to be member-led as
“not really panning out”, so decisions ultimately on behalf of whole commu-
nities were made by a small number of staff:
We are struggling a little bit for it to be really member-led, so we are tending to
direct a little bit more than we would like. Leanne, Network organizer.
However, in the knowledge that it was not member-led, the network
nevertheless maintained a desire to retain its position as representing mar-
ginalized equality communities in the city.
In that city, there was one formal equality representative in community
planning structures; this role had mainly been held by white men. One
network meeting that I participated in/observed was dominated by this
white male representative, who is also employed in the equality sector.
This role was initially envisioned to be held by someone acting in a voluntary
(i.e. unpaid) capacity (someone with “lived experience” of in/equalities, not-
withstanding the considerable power imbalance that would have existed
between this person and all others occupying roles within this structure),
but this has not happened. His dominance at the meeting was commented
on by others whom I went on to interview, in addition to being observed
in my field notes (2017):
Like that meeting that went–well, we went along and we listened…most of
the time, it was [him] that was doing all the talking… I thought to myself
these events have to be inspiring, they have to be invigorating, so you come
out of the event thinking, “Right.” Rather than, “Oh, God.” Christopher,
network member.
It was difficult to imagine this meeting as an inclusive space for equality
sector practitioners of colour in particular.
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Amongmy participants, the fact that this role was held by a white man was
not always, however, problematized. In fact, by some equality practitioners,
one such positioned person occupying the role was looked on favourably,
since they were viewed as “unspecific” or “unbiased” as compared with mar-
ginalized others. In other words, in contrast to valuing representation of inter-
sectionally marginalized people, participants with a generic concept of
intersectionality appeared to think it is preferable if those whom they per-
ceive as more “neutral” people do the representing in the interests of inter-
sectionality. The network organizer felt that if symbolic equality roles were
held by those from single-issue organizations, they would not be able to
have an “intersectional” view – in the context of this role being held by a
white man, and other organizations being led by and for equality commu-
nities. I took the implication to be that from their perspective and within
this understanding of intersectionality, the current (white male) representa-
tive was preferred (field notes, 2018). Some seemed to doubt the abilities
of (some particular) others to think beyond their own experience and identity,
to feel that siloed thinking is so engrained that it cannot be overcome, and
that intersectionality stands a better chance of being practised by more
“generic” people and organizations. This is a view also shared by some
funders and policymakers.
Here, a figure is being constructed as neutral, as generic, as capable of
representing all others, as most capable of intersectionality. This figure is
from those groups constructed as the majority, in other words from those
groups which are dominant: white and British, non-disabled, cisgender,
not too young and not too old, and not too religious. This figure is con-
structed as capable of knowing about and doing intersectionality, while
“those groups who are subject to misrepresentation find that this
serves to make them less credible knowledge claimants… the misrecog-
nition of their social identity works to undermine their position as
knowers” (McConkey 2004, 203). The intersectional subjects of Black
woman (Jordan-Zachery 2013) and woman of colour are effaced and
implicitly constructed as self-interested, specific and ungeneralisable,
and untrustworthy.
This constructed ideal figure is also from a “generic” or a multi-strand
organization. Here it is felt that single strand organizations are not able to
overcome their silos, which is a valid concern (Christoffersen 2021). Yet, inter-
sectional organizations are effaced within this, and their knowledge is doubly
constructed as too niche and specific to be able to know about and do inter-
sectionality (conceptualized generically).
However, many in the equality sector, comprised of organizations led by
and for their target group, have a low opinion of generic organizations.
Here, David, director of an LGBTI organization in England, explains:
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There’s what I call… generic… organisations which are people who are not
specialists but dabble in different communities. Sometimes there’s some
resentment against them because they’re seen as organisations that are not
from the community but they come in and take community money.
In the same city discussed above, in the former equality policy environ-
ment, the council hosted and administered strand-specific equality networks,
including a race equality network. For reasons partly due to the new multi-
strand equality policy context and largely owing to diminished resources,
the strand-specific equality networks were dissolved.
The council also funded a former race equality council, at the time a
“regional”, multi-strand equality organization, for strategic equality input
and infrastructure. Although now multi-strand because of policy pressure
described above, regional equality councils have tended to retain a strong
focus on race as compared with other multi-strand organizations which
lack this history – likely owing to the continued substantial representation
of BME antiracist advocates among the staff and in governance structures.
However, in order to establish a new local equality network which was one
of my cases, a network intended by the council to be “intersectional” from the
outset, funding was removed from this multi-strand equality organization,
with a history and key focus on race. In other words, in the name of intersec-
tionality, funding was removed from race equality to go towards generic “inter-
sectional” equality; funding was removed from a BME-led and predominantly
BME organization (in part, on the basis that it was incapable of sufficient inter-
sectionality) and given to a white-led and predominantly white organization
(constructed as being capable of, indeed best positioned to do, intersectionality).
Here again, intersectionality is given the meaning of “generic”, namely: where
no equality strand is addressed in particular, and equality is constructed as
being for and about “everyone” (white people) rather than marginalized
groups.
In spite of its mandate to represent all equality communities in the city, in
my field notes, I observed the whiteness of the equality network (space, meet-
ings, events, member organizations) developed by the organization con-
structed as being capable of intersectionality. But this may or may not
even be problematized in a discourse, where race is constructed as specific
and non-intersectional (qua generic).
As Anya, practitioner in a racial justice organization observed in a different
context,
Some of them [public sector partners] don’t really get what [intersectionality] is.
They get it confused with sort of cross strand approaches, or sometimes even
worse they get it confused with blanket approaches, like “We need to be
mindful of intersectionality so we’d better not focus on race”!? [laughs] and
you go, What!? Stop it.
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Organizers of this network acknowledged that engagement from BME
groups in the network was low, and mentioned the possibility of doing tar-
geted work around this; at the time of writing, this had not happened, due
to alternative structures emerging (explored below).
In this context, practitioners working on racial justice in some capacity felt
that race had been marginalized, as Raka, director, BME women of faith
organization explained.
All the tokenism and everything like that seems to be going out of the window
as well now. It’s kind of like at the bare faced level of we’ve got rid of the race-
we’re an equality… based thing-and that works across all six [sic] strands…
Now, it’s just an equality network. Race has fallen off the agenda.
This perspective is particularly noteworthy, since according to some litera-
ture on intersectionality and public policy (e.g. Hankivsky and Christoffersen
2011), it would be organizations such as this that might be expected to
benefit from the establishment of a multi-strand network, as opposed to
single strand networks. In a single strand network model, intersectional
organizations may (i) feel compelled to participate in more than one
network (i.e. a race and a women’s network), which would take twice the
resource to do; and (ii) feel that their issues and experiences are compartmen-
talized, and inadequately addressed. However, this is precisely opposite to
the view of this organization, within which some were supporters of the
new equality network at its inception, but changed their perspective when
they felt that race was marginalized by the network’s generic approach to
equality and to intersectionality.
Resisting generic intersectionality
Generic approaches to equality and intersectionality engender resistance
from women of colour. Some of those who felt that race had been margina-
lized from policy agendas with both the dissolution of the council-admini-
strated race equality forum and within the new equality network itself
established a new racial justice forum. This forum brought together prac-
titioners from different organizations to focus on strategic engagement
with key policymakers. It was not funded by the council or other funders,
so although those involved worked in the sector, the time they spent on
this was outwith their jobs. Participants described it being made up predomi-
nantly of women of colour. This forum arose as a direct response to what they
perceived as the marginalization of race in the funded, “intersectional” equal-
ity network, as Emma, practitioner in a racial justice organization explained.
That’s part of the reason that the [forum] was set up. It’s because they felt that
the council had taken funding from lots of different organisations and just
created this body that was apparently meant to address all protected
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characteristics…we did feel that [the new “intersectional” network] wasn’t
looking at race.
Raka agreed,
There was quite a discussion amongst quite a few people that have been
involved in [racial justice work] for many, many years… that there is nothing
now to challenge [the] council about what’s happening around the race agenda.
When they did not feel included in or represented by the new network oper-
ating with a generic concept of intersectionality, intersectionally marginalized
women of colour organized to represent the interests of communities of
colour. Given the lack of funding, however, there was some concern in partici-
pant narratives that this forum was not sustainable. Yet it is highly unlikely to
be funded by the council, since the council seeks generic intersectionality as
value for money in the context of austerity and has funded the development
of the new network accordingly. At the time of research, participants were
trying to gain funding for the forum:
People think that everybody wants to be paid all the time but sometimes these
… organisations do need somebody that’s paid… if everything’s… piecemeal,
we’ll never have the same clout as something that’s as organised from a base.
Representation and opposing understandings of
intersectionality
I have identified that there are competing understandings of intersectionality
in circulation among research participants, as well as in wider academia and
popular (feminist) culture; that, in fact, intersectionality is imbued with mean-
ings that are so opposed to one another, that its utility at all in this context is a
matter for debate. Some concepts of intersectionality are particularly
opposing.
The first of these is intersectionality as generic equality, firmly distanced
from the “specificity” of race, and serving to reconstruct whiteness as norma-
tive, and efface Black woman as both figure or intersectional subject and
embodied being (Lewis 2017). Equality networks employing this meaning
see themselves as representing everybody:
We’re representing all the protected characteristics… and not one is more
important than the other. We just wanted to sort of pre-empt any issues
around that with working with organisations that have a sole focus, and will
naturally see that as the most important, but we needed everyone to kind of
get together and be on a level. Leanne, Network organizer.
Moreover, here “intersectionality” itself represents or signifies everybody.
Within a generic understanding, it is either not deemed relevant who is
doing the representing, since the aim is to represent “everyone”; or, it is
ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 17
felt preferable to have figures constructed as occupying “neutral” social pos-
itions as representatives. This understanding of intersectionality is firmly
present in the construction of racial justice organizations as incapable of
intersectionality and in the policy decision to remove funding from one
such organization in order to fund “intersectionality”. It is in sharp contrast
to intersectionality’s focus on Black women, women of colour and those
who are most disadvantaged.
Importantly, all non-Black feminist organizations have an interest in dislod-
ging intersectionality from race/gender, and all white-led organizations (i.e.
all other equality sectors except the racial justice sector) have an interest in
dissociating intersectionality from race and race/gender, in contexts where
intersectionality is becoming the current “common sense” term to use in
relation to in/equality, expected and desired by funders. Indeed, its
growing popularity in policy both furthers and depends upon this dis-
sociation. One influential white-led organization, in particular, was perfectly
aware of intersectionality’s origins, but, frustrated with its continued associ-
ation with them, purposefully, and seemingly successfully sought to extend
its meanings in policy and in the sector. Those participants employing
generic intersectionality, namely white participants and white-led organiz-
ations, certainly use intersectionality without any meaningful attention to
race, Black women or women of colour. Generic intersectionality enables
the creation of a positive construction of a white identity as the “intersec-
tional” equality professional representing “everybody”, which, though they
would not deny historical racism, consistent with the postracial (Goldberg
2015), it is discursively assigned to the past. This subject position is therefore
relieved of responsibilities to meaningfully engage with concepts of privilege
and complicity, or enduring structures of white supremacy. Without the post-
racial, this concept of intersectionality and positive identity construction
become untenable.
Clearly, there is a pressing need to challenge white-led organizations and
white practitioners and policymakers who do not recognize white supremacy,
engage race and race/gender in their work which they describe as intersec-
tionality, arising not solely from intersectionality’s origins, but from commit-
ments to racial and intersectional justice and the empirical positions of race
and race/gender as fundamental organizing logics of and social divisions pro-
ducing inequality in the UK.
An alternative applied concept of intersectionality, as work of and with
specific intersectionally marginalized groups (Christoffersen 2021), can be
described in opposing terms to generic intersectionality. Emma felt that
the alternative race equality forum was intersectional, insofar as it was predo-
minantly women of colour involved.
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Most of the network members are Black women… from that perspective [inter-
sectionality] comes up a lot… because of structural issues it’s looking at struc-
tural issues on race. There’s an implied intersectionality but nothing’s explicit.
It is clear that this understanding of intersectionality is directly opposed to
generic intersectionality. This distinction is important because in the city
where these stories unfolded, generic intersectionality has much more
power than other concepts.
Conclusions
Generic intersectionality strips intersectionality of any attention to power and
marginality. It is employed in the interests of maintaining white supremacy,
gendered racism and racialized sexism and to rationalize a lack of public
sector investment in equality work (especially racial justice work) in the
context of austerity politics. Through ostensibly treating everyone the
same, in practice, it privileges and extends whiteness.
Within a generic concept of it, intersectionality is mobilized in order to dis-
place specific focus on racial justice. This is significant not only in light of aca-
demic debates (re)locating intersectionality in the intersection of race/
gender, with women of colour key subjects (e.g. Hancock 2016). It resonates
with critiques of the erasure of Black women and race in intersectionality
research (e.g. Alexander-Floyd 2012), or in other words, white appropriation
of/colonisation (Tomlinson 2013) of intersectionality, indicating similar era-
sures in equality policy and practice. The use of intersectionality to theorize
social divisions other than those positioning women of colour is controversial
among intersectionality theorists, and in wider popular (Black) feminist
culture. Yet, in the equality policy and third sector environments in
England and Scotland, there is little detectable awareness of these debates
among powerful actors. Among these, intersectionality tends to be used in
an unspecified way, across the up to nine protected characteristics which
are named in the Equality Act 2010 (Christoffersen 2019), or, in the case of
generic intersectionality, an empty, and white, category of “everyone”.
Some applied concepts of intersectionality that I identified (Christoffersen
2021) are consistent with US-based literature revealing where intersectional-
ity is used apolitically as synonymous with diversity (e.g. May 2015; Nash
2019), yet I also depart from this in further identifying very generic uses of
intersectionality. Whereas “diversity” may connote difference in individua-
lized and singular ways and may be used in the US context, in particular,
to mean racial or ethnic diversity, within generic intersectionality, difference
is flattened, and intersectionality becomes a new word for equality as liberal
sameness. The existence of this concept of intersectionality is a notable cause
for concern, since while scholars may reasonably dismiss it as not being
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intersectionality as they know it, it goes much further than uses of intersec-
tionality as institutionalization of diversity in advancing insidious inequalities,
especially along racial lines: it gives a new name to equality as liberal same-
ness for the current moment and future. Having quietly achieved common
sense status in some policy contexts, on its own terms it has been operatio-
nalized to effect.
Within a discourse of generic intersectionality, working on issues that
affect only the most intersectionally disadvantaged is successfully con-
structed as being niche, not value for money, siloed and divisive, and not
actually intersectional. Generic intersectionality is used to rationalize a wield-
ing of power against the racial justice sector, in the form of material divest-
ment and effacement per se (forcing organizations to change their
missions entirely, and removing funding from them even when they
comply). Racial justice organizations have been pressured to engage other
inequalities in a way that other (white-led) equality sectors have not and
are constructed as not intersectional since an assumption is already
present that they will not or cannot: they are pressured to do something
which they are already presumed to be incapable of doing or unwilling to
do. At work here are implicit and familiar constructions of racial justice organ-
izations (led by people of colour) as being more sexist, more homophobic,
more ableist and more conservatively religious than white-led organizations.
This displacement of racial justice from intersectionality serves to strengthen
constructed associations of other inequalities and the equality sectors
working on them with whiteness. Racial justice organizations are constructed
as uniquely incapable of doing intersectionality, with real material conse-
quences for those organizations, while white-led organizations benefit from
this construction, since they are by necessity simultaneously constructed as
uniquely capable of intersectionality. Whiteness is reconstructed as normative
and given a “progressive” intersectional quality.
Many practitioners recognize the threat of this understanding of intersec-
tionality. In contexts where this meaning is dominant, not only is the viability
of racial justice work under threat, but all work of intersectional organizations,
and that employing more productive concepts of intersectionality by other
organizations is as well. This includes in particular organizations led by and
for Black women and women of colour, which like racial justice organizations,
are constructed as incapable of doing intersectionality by their equality sector
“colleagues”. Intersectionally marginalized, misrecognized and misrepre-
sented people (and organizations of them) are thus constituted as non-cred-
ible knowers about and doers of intersectionality, unable to think beyond
their own experience and identities. Women of colour are constructed as
niche, specific and non-credible knowers about intersectionality, a violent
effacement which is both discursive and material. I found subtle but unmis-
takeable indications of belief in the desirability of representation in the name
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of intersectionality to be “neutral”, “non-specific” and “unbiased”, both
implicitly and explicitly constructed as those occupying dominant social pos-
itions, constructed as the only ones capable of knowing about and doing
intersectionality, and as representing all others; and not representing a
specific equality “interest” or organization, but rather, “everybody”.
In a broader context of epistemic injustice which devalues intersectionally
marginalized women of colour as non-credible knowers, in response and
resistance to generic intersectionality, they organize to represent themselves
and people of colour more broadly, rather than placing faith in single strand
equality organizations or generic equality networks to do so; they declare
themselves present (Lewis 2017).
Generic intersectionality represents, perhaps, intersectionality’s appropria-
tion for the supposed interests of a constructed monolithic white working
class (in the UK, all imagined to reside in the north of England where,
indeed, the Cabinet Office Equality Hub which will deal with intersectionality
is being moved (Truss 2020)). Developing uses of “intersectionality” in equal-
ity policy discourse require careful attention as to its generic quality. Mean-
while, during ongoing austerity newly funded racial justice work in the
light of BLM has the challenging task ahead of negotiating paternalistic
calls for it to be more generically “intersectional” (amidst racist presumptions
that it cannot) on the one hand, and on the other, serving the interests of
women and other intersectionally marginalized people of colour.
Notes
1. “Strand” is common terminology among policymakers and practitioners for
equality area, e.g. race equality, gender, disability, etc. “Single strand” or
“strand specific” is used to mean single issue. I also use “equality group” or
“equality community”, by which I mean, marginal groups pertaining to the
strand, i.e. women, disabled people, etc.
2. For instance, in feminist political science, the term “activist” is at times proble-
matically applied to those who are employed and paid by equality (women’s)
organizations, and the term “movement” is used to encompass both third
sector and the grassroots, thereby obscuring conflicting interests of each.
3. The organization developed purposefully to be Black majority led among its
trustees during my time there, which is distinct from a “Black LGBTQ organiz-
ation” since permanent staff were usually majority white and our priority
target communities were the overlapping groups of Black, Deaf, disabled and
female LGBTQ people.
4. While its use as a term declined, as a set of practices multiculturalism’s enduring
legacy is more complex (Meer and Modood 2014).
5. Here used in the political sense following the organization’s own self-
description.
6. I do not wish to romanticize the affected racial justice organizations as beacons
of intersectional thought and practice. To do so would be to perpetuate the
erasure of Black women and women of colour which intersectionality responds
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to. By and large, this has been a male-dominated sector (this is oft-repeated
among participants, yet I question whether this sector really is or has been
more male-dominated than other sectors, and what else might be at work in
these pronouncements). Therefore, self-organized, autonomous organizations
led by and for Black women and women of colour have long existed.
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